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Abstract This paper assesses the impact of legal trades by corporate insiders on the
liquidity of the firm’s stock. For this purpose, we analyze two liquidity measures and
one information asymmetry measure. The analysis allows us to study as well the effect
of a change in insider trading regulation, namely the implementation of the Market
Abuse Directive (European Union Directive 2003/6/EC) on the Dutch stock market.
The first set of results shows that, in accordance with theories of asymmetric informa-
tion, the intensity of legal insider trading in a given company is positively related to
the bid-ask spread and to the information asymmetry measure. We also find that the
Market Abuse Directive did not reduce significantly this effect. Secondly, analyzing
liquidity and information asymmetry around the days of legal insider trading, we find
that small and large capitalization stocks see their bid-ask spread and the permanent
price impact increase when insiders trade. For mid-cap stocks, only the permanent
price impact increases. Finally, we could not detect a significant improvement of these
results following the change in regulation.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we study stock market liquidity around dates of legal insider trading in
the Netherlands. Trades by corporate insiders are highly regulated, especially since the
EuropeanUnion directive called “MarketAbuseDirective” (EuropeanUnionDirective
2003/6/EC) was incorporated into the Dutch national regulation. Even so, insiders are
known to have better information than outside investors about the future prospects
of their firm (see e.g. Degryse et al. 2014). In this context, we investigate whether
legal trades by insiders in shares of their own company have an impact on the stock’s
liquidity.
Market liquidity of a firm’s stock is a characteristic that determines partially the risk
of the firm’s equity and thus the cost of capital. It also affects trading costs to outsiders.
Both have an important effect of corporate finance decisions (see esp. Amihud and
Mendelson 2008). For this reason, it is important to understand how corporate insiders
affect their company’s stock liquidity when they trade.
The Market Abuse Directive aims at tightening and at expanding stock market reg-
ulation regarding market abuse and manipulation, and in particular insider trading. Its
goal is also to harmonize the legislation in countries of the European Union. Incorpo-
rated intoDutch regulation onOctober 1st, 2005, the two aspects of this new regulation
that are important for our study are, first, the strengthening of monitoring and pun-
ishment of illegal insider trading. Therefore, corporate insiders are less likely to trade
upon inside information. Second, the new regulation obliges listed companies to dis-
close through press releases any information that is relevant for the valuation of the
stock. As such, if companies disclosemore information, then corporate insiders should
in principle have less information advantage over outside investors. These two effects
together should decrease the information asymmetry of corporate insiders’ trades.
Our contribution on this subject is analyzing whether the effect of insider trading
on the stock’s liquidity changed after the implementation of this European Union wide
regulation. We tackle this topic by studying data from the Netherlands. The research
questions analyzed in this paper are the following. How do legal insider trades affect
stock market liquidity? Do the bid-ask spread and price impact increase? Does the
implementation of the European Union Market Abuse Directive reduce the effect of
insider trading on the liquidity of the stocks?
Two approaches are used to analyze these research questions. A first approach looks
at the effect of the intensity, or the prevalence, of insider trading on the average stock
liquidity and permanent price impact. This is a cross-sectional approach. The second
approach proceeds by looking more closely at the short-term effect around dates of
legal insider trading. More specifically, we calculate the impact on a stock’s illiquidity
induced by the presence of corporate insiders on the market, by subtracting illiquidity
measures on the date of the trading by the same measure obtained during a benchmark
period.We label this as “abnormal illiquidity”. This is repeated for each insider trading
event and for each firm. This abnormal illiquidity is then analyzed in a regression
framework. The goal is to assess whether the presence of informed traders creates
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abnormal illiquidity, be it by enlarging the bid-ask spread or the adverse selection
component of the spread (as measured by the permanent price impact of trades).
Our findings are that insider trading is important to explain liquidity both on the
cross-section and around event dates. On the cross-section, stocks with more insider
trading have wider spreads and a larger permanent price impact. Also, we show that
the Market Abuse Directive helped to reduce this effect. On a finer time frame, we
found that on days of insider trading, the spreads and price impact are larger than on
other days (this is true mostly for small and large companies, but it is less the case for
medium-sized stocks). This analysis did not allow us to identify a positive effect of
the Market Abuse Directive.
This paper brings together three strands of literature, the first of which is about
legal insider trading. Several papers show that legal insider trading helps to predict
future stock price performance (see e.g. Seyhun 1998; Lakonishok and Lee 2001; Jeng
et al. 2003; Fidrmuc et al. 2006; Degryse et al. 2014). This is consistent with trades by
corporate insiders being perceived by other stock market participants as based partly
on private information. The current paper extends this literature by analyzing whether
a stock’s liquidity measures on dates of insider trading are different compared to non
insider trading days.
The second strand of literature related to our study includes papers that analyze
market liquidity around information events. For example, Lee et al. (1993), Krinsky
and Lee (1996) and Kavajecz (1999) study the bid-ask spread and adverse selection
costs around earnings announcements. Aktas et al. (2007) study the probability of
informed trading (PIN) aroundmerger and acquisition announcements. This literature,
like the present paper, aims at testing empirical implications of theoretical market
microstructure models of adverse selection (see e.g. Kyle 1985; Glosten and Milgrom
1985; O’Hara 1995 or de Jong and Rindi 2009 provide a review of these models).
This paper also relates to the literature about financial market regulation, and specif-
ically about insider trading regulation. It thus contributes to the debate about the
efficiency of insider trading regulations (see e.g. Bainbridge 2000; Bhattacharya and
Daouk 2002). For this purpose, we also analyze the effect of a change in regulation
concerning insider trading on the Dutch stock market. A similar analysis of a change
in insider trading regulation is done by Frijns et al. (2008) for the New Zealand Stock
Exchange. The authors study whether the average adverse selection component of the
spreads of all stocks on the exchange changed when new regulations about insider
trading were adopted in New Zealand. They find a reduction of adverse selection after
the implementation of the regulation. While their paper only investigates liquidity
measures around the change in regulation, the present paper goes one step further by
also looking specifically on dates where insiders traded.
The literature studying legal insider trading and effects onmarket liquidity is scarce.
The existing papers use a cross-sectional approach to compare the impact of insider
trading on spreads across firms. Chung and Charoenwong (1998) study the bid-ask
spread of US stocks and relate it to legal insider trading. They find that in average,
firms with larger extent of legal insider trading have larger spreads, but contrary to our
results, they do not find evidence that spreads increase in the period around legal insider
trading. Khan et al. (2005) study the impact of insider trading on market liquidity in
the NASDAQ market. They obtain mixed results and provide the interpretation that
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dealers are unable to detect informed investors on the market. We improve upon these
studies by analyzing more sophisticated measures of the spread including the adverse
selection component. In addition, we extend the results for a different market structure,
which is, in our case, a fully automated limit order book market. Also related to this
strand of literature, Aktas et al. (2008) study the contribution to price discovery that
is due to legal insider trading. Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) and Gleason (2007)
study the difference in response to insider trading bymarketmakers betweenNASDAQ
and NYSE.
A recent analysis similar to ours was done in the Hong Kong stock exchange
(Cheng et al. 2006) using a different methodology from ours. They perform a pooled
cross-section and time series regression of daily liquidity measures (calculated using
intraday data) on explanatory variables and on a dummy variable to identify insider
trading days.Consistentwith our finding, theyfind that liquidity and depth is negatively
affected by insider trades.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and the
methodology, and provides descriptive statistics about different liquidity measures.
Section 3 presents results of a cross-sectional analysis of the effect of intensity of
legal insider trading on the average liquidity of stocks. Section 4 presents a day-by-
day analysis of the effect of legal insider trading on the stock’s liquidity. Finally, Sect.
5 concludes.
2 Data and Methodology
Our data on legal insider trading is obtained from theAFM (Authority for the Financial
Markets, the Dutch financial markets supervisor). The dataset consists of the days for
which a corporate insider traded shares, for each stock. Unfortunately, the trade time
during the day is not included in the dataset, rendering it impossible to study intraday
changes in a stock’s liquidity. We use only trades in shares by Directors and Board
members (top executives). Trades related to option exercise are excluded.1 When
many insiders from the same company trade during a given day, we aggregate the
order flow, so that for each company-date pair we can determine whether it is an
insider net purchase date or an insider net sale date.
Prior to October 2005, the main article of law that regulated insider trading by
directors and board members was the Act of the Disclosure of Major Holdings of
1996 (Wmz 1996). In 1999, an important change to this regulation was introduced: all
corporate insiders had to notify their trades in their own company’s stock to a public
registry. The reporting delay was set to 10 days after the end of the month in which the
trade occurred. In 2002, this reporting delay was reduced to one business day for top
executives, i.e. the insiders analyzed in this paper. In October 2005, the Market Abuse
Directive (European Union Directive 2003/6/EC) was implemented into the Dutch
law. This new regulation increased substantially the punishment to illegal insider
1 For example, insiders often sell shares immediately after having acquired them through a stock option
scheme. Such sales are not taken into account in the present analysis. Degryse et al. (2014) and Cziraki
et al. (2013) analyze option exercise by corporate insiders in the Netherlands.
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trading and made it mandatory for listed firms to disclose price-sensitive information
through press releases. One of the concerns that led to this regulation was that insiders
were incited to trade in advance of important company news announcements (AFM
2007). Raising the penalty to this behavior and requiring every company to publish
news announcements on a timely manner aimed at reducing information leakage and,
therefore, increasingmarket cleanliness.According toAFM(2007), the new regulation
reduced information leakage prior to press releases mainly for small firms, as well as
technological firms. These firms have typically lower governance structures and thus
are more prone to suspicious insider trading. In contrast, large firms often have very
stringent rules about their executives’ trades (e.g. executives are allowed to trade only
during a certain window after earnings announcements). Therefore, we hypothesize
that small firms will have a larger effect of insider trading on their stock’s liquidity
and price impact. Also, we expect to find a stronger effect of the new regulation for
these firms. We refer to Degryse et al. (2014) for more detail about the dataset and the
institutional and regulatory details concerning insider trading in the Netherlands.
In order to compute liquidity measures and the price impact, we use high frequency
data from Euronext Amsterdam. The database contains all executed trades and best
quotes, and covers the period from July 2004 to December 2007. We use also Datas-
tream to obtain the market capitalization of stocks in the sample.
2.1 Methodology
Two measures of liquidity and one measure of adverse selection are computed on a
daily basis. The first measure is the quoted spread. It is defined as the relative spread
between the best ask and the best bid for a given stock on a given date:
QS = 1
T
T∑
t=1
At − Bt
mt
,
where the T quotes that appear during the trading day are used, and where At and Bt
are the best ask price and the best bid price, respectively, at each quote update. mt is
the mid-quote defined as (At + Bt ) /2.
The second measure, the effective spread, is twice the relative spread between the
trade price and the prevailing mid-quote:
ES = 2
T
T∑
t=1
∣∣∣∣
Pt − mt
mt
∣∣∣∣ .
Here, the spread is computed for the T trades that occur during the trading day.
The difference between this measure and the previous quoted spread is that a trade
can “walk up” the order book in case the trade size is larger than the outstanding best
quote. In that case the trade price might be larger than the best ask in case of a purchase
order, or lower than then best bid in case of a sell order. The effective spread takes this
into account.
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Fig. 1 Illustration of the spread measures. This figure illustrates the liquidity measures. A is the best ask
quote, B is the best bid quote, m is the mid-quote and T is the price at which the trade executes. The
effective spread is the difference between the transaction price and the quote mid-point. The trade occurs at
time t . At time t + n the realized spread (the difference between the transaction price and the future quote
mid-point) and the price impact (the difference between the quote mid-point at the time of the trade and the
future quote mid-point) are measured. Note that in this figure, the trade occurs at the prevailing ask price.
It does not have to be so
Themeasure of adverse selection that we use is the permanent price impact2 defined
as twice the relative spread between the prevailing quote mid-point at the time of a
trade, and the future quote mid-point:
PI = 2
T
T∑
t=1
qt
mt+n − mt
mt
, (1)
where qt is the direction of the trade (+1 for a purchase and −1 for a sale). We
use several time frames to determine the future quote mid-point (i.e. the value of n),
ranging from 1min to 1h (see Sect. 2.2). To compute all three measures, we discard
opening and closing auctions, as well as cross-trades. Figure 1 helps to understand the
meaning of these measures by showing an example of a purchase.
In order to perform a cross-sectional analysis, we use two different proxies for the
intensity, or prevalence, of legal insider trading. The first intensitymeasure, INT1, is the
total number of shares traded by insiders for a given company, scaled by the number of
shares outstanding. The second intensity proxy, INT2, is the number of insider trading
days over the total number of trading days; in other words, the proportion of trading
days with legal insider trading.We hypothesize that themore days with insider trading,
2 The use of the permanent price impact as a measure of informational content of trades is due to Huang
and Stoll (1996) and Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997).
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the more information asymmetry there is between market participants and insiders,
and thus the less liquid the stock will be.
To analyze the behavior of the spread around dates of insider trading, we use a
methodology that closely resembles the event study methodology. “Abnormal Illiq-
uidity”, or AI for short is a daily measure of change in liquidity compared to a
benchmark liquidity.3 The idea is to subtract a given measure of illiquidity of a stock
on a day by the expected illiquidity, or benchmark illiquidity. The illiquidity measures
used are the quoted bid-ask spread, the effective bid-ask spread, and the permanent
price impact.4
More formally, Abnormal Illiquidity for stock i on event date t is measured as
follows:
AIit = Illiquidityit − Benchmarkit ,
where the Benchmark illiquidity is computed by averaging the measure of illiquidity
on days −10 until +10 around the insider trading day, excluding days 0 to 4 (i.e. five
trading days starting on the date of insider trading). The Abnormal Illiquidity can thus
be obtained for five days: the date of insider trading itself, and the following four
trading days. The rationale for using a window of five days to measure Abnormal
Illiquidity is because it might be possible that market participants detect the presence
of insiders with a delay, and they might adjust the bid-ask spread with some lag. This
is a similar approach to other papers in the literature that perform short-term event
studies on market microstructure effects. Researchers typically use shorter estimation
and event windows compared to the traditional event study methodology. Chung and
Charoenwong (1998) use as event period a window of five days before and after
the event date, and as benchmark period 15 days before and after the estimation
period. Garfinkel and Nimalendran (2003) also perform a short-term event study with
microstructure measures. They compare liquidity measures on insider trading dates,
i.e. a one-day event window, with a benchmark of five trading days. Moreover, Chung
and Charoenwong (1998) find that there is a change in the bid-ask spread on date
of insider trading and also to some extent on some following days. But no change is
detected in liquidity and market conditions before the insider trading date. For these
reasons, it is reasonable for us to take an event window of five days starting on the
insider trading date, and an estimation window of 16 days around the event window.
The Abnormal Illiquidity measures from day 0 to day 4, for a given stock, are
then added up to obtain what we call Cumulative Abnormal Illiquidity (CAI ). This
measure is to be interpreted simply as the sum of the above average illiquidity of the
stock over five days.
The methodology used allows to test whether the CAI ’s are statistically different
from zero and closely follows the event study methodology.5 The CAI ’s for all the
stocks and events of insider trading are then averaged. We thus obtain the average
3 The concept of Abnormal Illiquidity measure is analogous to Abnormal Returns, used in event studies.
4 When the bid-ask spread increases, the stock is less liquid. This is why we call it a measure of illiquidity.
5 The following description of the test statistic is analogous to the J2 statistic for standard event studies as
exposed in Campbell et al. (1997), chapter 4.
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CAI due to the presence of insiders on the market. To test whether the average CAI
is different from zero, we first standardize each CAI by its estimation error, then we
aggregate these standardized CAI ’s to obtain a statistic that has a known distribution,
from which we obtain the critical values. The standardized CAI , or SC AI , for event
i is:
SC AIi = CAIist-err(CAIi )
Each individual standardized CAI is distributed as a Student t distribution withm−1
degrees of freedom, where m is the number of observations used to compute the
benchmark illiquidity (in our case, m = 16). The variance of this distribution is m−1m−3 .
Define SC AI as the average standardized CAI :
SC AI = 1
N
N∑
i=1
CAIi
st-err(CAIi )
.
Then
var
(
SC AI
) = 1
N
m−1
m−3 ,
because we assume no cross-correlation betwen CAIi and CAI j , for i = j . As a
result, the following statistic, called simply z, is distributed as standard normal:
z =
√
N m−3m−1 SC AI ∼ N (0, 1).
The z statistic is used to make inferences about the average cumulative abnormal
illiquidity.
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about insider trades and the companies in the
sample. To get an idea of how these statistics change with company size, we separate
into market capitalization terciles. Also, for some statistics, we show how they change
before and after the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive (MAD).
Panel A of Table 1 shows the incidence of insider trading. We see that companies
have from 7.2 to 15.3 insider trades per year, depending on their size, with an overall
average of about 10 insider trades per firm per year. These numbers are of comparable
magnitude to the sample used by Chung and Charoenwong (1998), which represents
the US market during the year 1988 (they have an average of 10 insider trades per
firm per year). However, in our sample, insider trades represent a lower proportion
of all trades compared to Chung and Charoenwong’s sample (0.006% in our sample
compared to 0.07% in theirs). Panels B and C show the size of trades by insiders
as proportion of shares outstanding (Panel B) and in value (Panel C). In every case,
the mean is much larger than the median, indicating a large skewness. Insider trade
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Small Medium Large All
Panel A: Average number of trades per year
Insider trades 7.2 6.3 15.3 10.1
Non insider trades 19,468 65,269 343,477 162,923
Percentage of insider trades 0.037% 0.010% 0.004% 0.006%
Panel B: Insider trade size scaled by shares outstanding (×1000)
All periods
Mean 10.11 2.89 0.44 3.96
Median 0.303 0.274 0.020 0.114
Before MAD
Mean 7.91 5.21 0.80 4.02
Median 0.244 0.289 0.012 0.083
After MAD
Mean 10.91 0.75 0.23 3.92
Median 0.335 0.248 0.025 0.125
Panel C: Insider trade value (thousand euros)
All periods
Mean 818.5 835.4 694.3 774.5
Median 51.9 111.6 78.8 82.8
Before MAD
Mean 557.7 1036.5 276.3 641.6
Median 8.9 98.4 59.8 60.8
After MAD
Mean 913.7 650.2 941.7 854.7
Median 74.7 169.8 94.8 99.1
Panel D: INT1
All periods
Mean 57.8 11.4 14.8 27.9
SD 131.4 39.9 48.0 85.8
Before MAD
Mean 34.0 11.8 16.5 21.8
SD 52.6 43.9 59.4 52.6
After MAD
Mean 85.1 11.1 13.4 33.2
SD 182.7 37.7 37.8 106.6
Panel E: INT2
All periods
Mean 1.53% 1.20% 1.82% 1.52%
SD 2.32% 1.19% 2.96% 2.27%
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Table 1 continued
Small Medium Large All
Before MAD
Mean 1.86% 1.08% 1.49% 1.51%
SD 2.95% 1.09% 1.64% 2.12%
After MAD
Mean 1.15% 1.29% 2.08% 1.52%
SD 1.24% 1.27% 3.71% 2.41%
Panel F: Average daily number of trades
Number of stock-days
Non insider trading days 1981 2113 2380 6474
Insider trading days 259 306 386 951
Mean number of trades
Non insider trading days 75 258 1698 731
Insider trading days 76 273 1441 694
Mean trade size (euros)
Non insider trading days 1008 1603 2497 1750
Insider trading days 1346 1515 2425 1838
Panel G: Market capitalization (million euros)
Market capitalization 139 620 15,400 6358
This table shows descriptive statistics about the companies in the sample, trades by insiders, and normal
trades that execute on the Euronext stock market. Panel A shows market capitalization, obtained by multi-
plying the price per share by the total number of shares outstanding at the beginning of each calendar year.
Panel B shows the mean and median size of trades by insiders, for the period before the implementation of
Market Abuse Directive (MAD), after its implementation as well as for the whole period. Panel C shows
the insider trade sizes in euros. Panels D and E show the mean and standard deviation of the intensity mea-
sures: INT1 is computed as the total shares traded by insiders scaled by the number of shares outstanding
in thousands. INT2 is the percentage of trading days with insider trading. Panels F and G show statistics
about the trades executed on the Euronext platform: number of stock-days observations, the mean number
of trades per day and the mean trade size in euros
sizes as a proportion of shares outstanding are smaller for larger companies. In terms
of value traded, there is no clear pattern with respect to firm size. Panels D and E
show the mean and standard deviation of the intensity measures INT1 and INT2. Both
variables are fairly stable between periods (before and after MAD). Panel F shows the
total number of observations (stock-day pairs), and the number and size of intraday
trades, during days without insider trading as well as days with insider trading. We
see that the mean trade size is increasing with market capitalization. We see also that
the mean number of trades per day as well as the mean trade size in euro is not largely
different on days of insider trading compared to days without insider trading. Finally,
Panel G shows the market capitalization of the stocks in our sample.
We now determine which intraday time frame is suitable in order to compute the
permanent price impact (the index n in Eq. 1). In order to do so, it is useful to show a
graph of the price impact as a function of intraday time. See Fig. 2.
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Fig. 2 Price impact. This graph shows the mean price impact of trades, for each market capitalization
tercile. The price impact is scaled by the quote mid-point. Time is in seconds. The data used are all days
with insider trading plus 10 days prior and after the trades
Using all company-date couples in the sample (insider trading days as well as 10
days prior and after the trading day itself), Fig. 2 shows the realized spread using
several time frames: 1, 2, 5, 10min, and all multiples of 5min until 1h. All trades are
used (insider trading dates as well as non insider trading dates). The data are separated
into three categories of stocks sorted by market capitalization. The graph shows that
it takes some time for the information content of a trade to be incorporated into the
quotes. We see also that a different time frame should be used for each size category.
For large firms, after 10min the price impact curve is practically flat. This means that
after 10min, the information content of the trade is almost entirely impacted in the
quotes. For medium firms, a 30-min time frame seems to be reasonable. For small
firms, the price impact increases until at least 1h after the trade. For this reason, we
use 10, 30 and 60min time frame for large, medium and small firms, respectively, in
order to compute the permanent price impact of each trade.
Table 2 shows some descriptive statistics about the spread measures. Consistent
with the literature on market liquidity, the quoted spread and effective spread both
are decreasing functions of market capitalization. The (permanent) price impact can
be seen as the profits to informed traders. We see that the price impact is larger for
small firms. This is consistent with the view that small firms suffer more from adverse
selection costs than large firms, since they are typicallymore opaque, and less followed
by the press and by analysts.
In the next section, we analyze how the intensity of insider trading affects the
average liquidity and price impact of stocks on the cross-sectional level.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics of
the liquidity measures
This table shows descriptive
statistics about the liquidity
measures. The quoted spread,
the effective spread, and the
price impact are in relative terms
(i.e. percentage of price). The
price impact is computed with
an horizon of 10min for large
firms, 30min for medium firms,
and 60min for small firms. See
Sect. 2. The table shows for each
market capitalization tercile the
mean of the liquidity measures,
for days of insider trading as
well as days without insider
trading. The sample is further
separated in the period pre- and
post-Market Abuse Directive
Small Medium Large All
Panel A: Quoted spread
Before MAD
Non ins. tr. days 1.434 0.680 0.398 0.744
Ins. tr. days 1.711 0.643 0.581 0.845
All days 1.454 0.677 0.412 0.752
After MAD
Non ins. tr. days 0.844 0.372 0.140 0.460
Ins. tr. days 0.891 0.369 0.518 0.602
All days 0.848 0.371 0.179 0.473
Panel B: Effective spread
Before MAD
Non ins. tr. days 1.334 0.605 0.370 0.681
Ins. tr. days 1.569 0.562 0.545 0.768
All days 1.351 0.602 0.384 0.688
After MAD
Non ins. tr. days 0.697 0.300 0.118 0.379
Ins. tr. days 0.750 0.299 0.474 0.519
All days 0.701 0.300 0.155 0.392
Panel C: Price impact
Before MAD
Nns. tr. days 0.215 0.178 0.097 0.155
Ins. tr. days 0.343 0.215 0.149 0.217
All days 0.225 0.181 0.101 0.160
After MAD
Non ins. tr. days 0.219 0.152 0.062 0.144
Ins. tr. days 0.296 0.188 0.103 0.190
All days 0.225 0.155 0.066 0.148
3 Intensity of Legal Insider Trading
This section answers the question whether, in the cross-section, liquidity providers on
themarket adjust the spreads depending on the intensity of insider trading. Since insid-
ers are investors that have informational advantages over other market participants,
we hypothesize that liquidity measures will be different depending on the intensity of
insider trading, i.e. depending on the likelihood of trading against an insider. As in
Chung and Charoenwong (1998), we regress the average stock liquidity on the known
explanatory variables, and on the intensity of insider trading. Also, we test for the
effect of the change in regulation regime, namely the implementation of the Market
Abuse Directive, similarly to Frijns et al. (2008).
The methodology used closely resembles the traditional methodology for analyz-
ing the determinants of the bid-ask spread (see Stoll 2000; Demsetz 1968 for an early
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treatment of this idea). But using a simple cross-sectional regression with one obser-
vation per stock, we would not be able to identify the effect due to the Market Abuse
Directive. Instead of using one observation per stock, we use one observation per
stock-period (pre- and post-MAD). This allows us to use a dummy variable to control
for the effect of the new regulation.6 Thus, the basis of observation is a stock-period,
where each variable is an average over the period. The effect of intensity of insider
trading on liquidity and price impact is obtained by adding the intensity measure in
the regression. Also, we add a dummy for MAD, to capture the effect of the regula-
tory regime. Finally, we add an interaction variable between MAD and intensity. The
regression equation is the following:
Liqi = β0 + β1logMCapi + β2 I nvPricei + β3logVoli + β4Voltyi + β5 I NT ki
+β6MADi + β7MAD × I NT ki + εi , (2)
where Liqi is the average of the liquiditymeasure under study (quoted spread, effective
spread and price impact, in percentage points); logMCapi is the log of the market
capitalization of stock-period i; I nvPricei is the inverse of the average price, using
daily closing prices for stock-period i; logVoli is the average daily trading volume;
Voltyi is the stock’s volatility calculated by the standard-deviation of the stock returns
over the whole sample period; INTki , k = 1, 2, is the intensity of insider trades, either
total shares traded, scaled by the number of shares outstanding in thousands (k = 1),
or proportion of days with insider trading (k = 2). We add an interaction variable of
the regulatory regime and insider trading intensity, MAD × INTki , that will capture
any difference in the effect of insider trading intensity on the spread before and after
the implementation of the Market Abuse Directive. We use standard errors consistent
for heteroskedasticity and clustering, since most companies enter the regression twice
and therefore their liquidity measures might not be independent for each observation.
The results of the regression are shown in Table 3.
The results show that the intensity of insider trading has an effect on the average
stock liquidity, after controlling for other factors. Both specifications (i.e. model (1)
with INT1 and model (2) with INT2) have positive coefficients for intensity of insider
trading on the quoted spread, the effective spread, and permanent price impact. The
coefficients are statistically significant formodel (1). Formodel (2), intensity of insider
tradinghas a significant effect only for the effective spread.7 Economic significance can
be measured by multiplying the coefficient by one standard-deviation of the intensity
variables. We see from the results that for a one standard-deviation increase in INT1
(i.e. 85.8 from Table 1), the quoted spread increases by roughly 0.1% compared
with an average quoted spread of 0.75% before MAD and 0.47% after MAD (from
Table 2). This is an economically significant effect. The magnitude of this effect is
similar to what is found in Chung and Charoenwong (1998) for the US market. Our
6 Note that some companies in the dataset do not appear in both periods. Indeed, some stocks are traded only
before MAD, while others appear only after its implementation. This means that the sample of companies
is less than doubled using this methodology.
7 Due to the clustering of the residuals, the degrees of freedom is 83, and so the cut-off points of the t
statistics are 1.66, 1.99 and 2.64 for the 10, 5 and 1% confidence levels, respectively.
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Table 3 Intensity of insider trading and stock liquidity
QS ES PI
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Intercept 1.6680 1.7070 1.3599 1.3867 0.4090 0.4217
(2.48) (2.50) (2.07) (2.08) (3.92) (3.97)
logMCap −0.0660 −0.0671 −0.0630 −0.0650 −0.0222 −0.0238
(−1.43) (−1.51) (−1.37) (−1.47) (−1.90) (−2.37)
InvPrice 1.0251 1.0354 1.0336 1.0429 0.0693 0.0694
(10.71) (10.48) (10.86) (10.74) (2.31) (2.50)
logVol −0.0586 −0.0625 −0.0413 −0.0439 −0.0049 −0.0045
(−1.02) (−1.09) (−0.73) (−0.78) (−0.42) (−0.44)
Volty 0.6155 0.6128 0.5863 0.5847 0.0964 0.0963
(1.82) (1.82) (1.76) (1.77) (2.00) (2.00)
INT1 0.0011 – 0.0011 – 0.0002 –
(2.41) (2.40) (1.92)
INT2 – 3.0576 – 3.5196 – 0.6417
(1.53) (1.77) (0.86)
MAD 0.2093 0.2555 0.1952 0.2450 0.0323 0.0345
(1.29) (1.36) (1.22) (1.32) (1.33) (1.22)
MAD × INT1 −0.0005 – −0.0005 – −0.0001 –
(−0.89) (−0.92) (−0.88)
MAD × INT2 – −3.2653 – −3.4945 – −0.1771
(−1.28) (−1.40) (−0.30)
N 135 135 135 135 135 135
Adj. R2 0.7396 0.7385 0.7369 0.7364 0.6399 0.6394
This table shows the effect of the intensity of insider trading on average stock liquidity, namely quoted
spread and effective spread, and on permanent price impact. Two measures of intensity of insider trading
are used. The first is the total number of shares traded by insiders for a given company, scaled by the number
of shares outstanding. The second intensity measure is the proportion of trading days with insider trading.
The explanatory variables are: log market capitalization (logMCap); the inverse of the average stock price
(InvPrice); the log of the average daily volume (logVol); the daily volatility (Volty); insider trading intensity
(INT1 and INT2); a dummy variable that equals 1 after the Market Abuse Directive, and zero otherwise
(MAD); an interaction term between MAD and insider trading intensity (MAD× INT1and MAD× INT2).
All variables are computed using all dates for which the companies are traded on Euronext Amsterdam,
from July 2004 until end of December 2007. Robust t statistics are shown in brackets
results for the effective spread are similar than for quoted spread. For the permanent
price impact, the results are weaker: an increase of one standard deviation of INT1
increases PI by about 0.02%. But this has to be compared with an average price impact
of 0.15–0.16%, which makes it still economically significant. Results for model (2)
using INT2, the proportion of days with insider trading, are of similar magnitude,
although the regression results show that the statistical significance is lower. Overall,
the regression results clearly show that a larger amount of insider trading harmsmarket
liquidity and adverse selection.
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Care has to be taken in the interpretation of the coefficient for the Market Abuse
Directive dummy. This coefficient might capture some differences between the two
periods that are not due to the regulation per se. For example, it is well known that
liquidity increases over time (this can be seen in the descriptive statistics in Table 2),
thus a negative coefficient is to be expected even if the new regulation did not have
any effect on liquidity. But what is observed is a positive coefficient, although not
significant. This is surprising because the result of MAD is to increase the penalty
to illegal insider trading as well as obliging companies to publish more information
in the form of press releases. This should lower the information asymmetry between
insiders and outside investors, and thus reduce the price impact. We do not observe
this effect.
The interaction term betweenMAD and INTk aims at capturing whether theMarket
Abuse Directive helped to reduce the impact of insider trading on stock liquidity. All
models have negative coefficients. These negative coefficients mean that the intensity
of insider trading is affecting less stock liquidity after the implementation of the new
regulation. However, the results are not statistically significant.
The results are similar to Frijns et al. (2008) but in their paper, only the price impact,
or the information content of trades, seems to be reduced due to the new regulation.8
This section showed that the average liquidity of stocks is affected by the intensity
of insider trading. The next section will investigate whether insiders have an effect on
the stock liquidity on days of their trades.
4 Stock Liquidity Around Dates of Legal Insider Trading
In this section, we want to analyze whether insiders affect stock liquidity and price
impact on the exact day when they trade. Before to start with the analysis of Abnormal
Illiquidity, we show the price impact curve, similar to Fig. 2, but this time separating
days when insiders trade (dashed lines) from days with no insider trading (solid line).
The graph can be seen in Fig. 3. We see that the price impact is in average larger on
days of insider trading. This is especially pronounced for small cap firms, where the
average price impact on days without insider trading is about 0.36%, while on insider
trading days, the average price impact reaches 0.48%.
Table 2 also shows how liquidity and adverse selection changes between days of
insider trading and days without insider trading.We can see that quoted spreads (Panel
A) and effective spreads (Panel B) are qualitatively larger on days of insider trading
compared to days without insider trading. Surprisingly, this is the case only for small
firms and large firms. It is not the case for medium firms. For the permanent price
impact (Panel C), this adverse selection measure is larger on insider trading days
compared to non-insider trading days for all firms sizes.
To give an example of how much this change in liquidity affects trading costs,
assume an investor trades for e10,000 of a large stock, after the Market Abuse Direc-
8 The difference between our results and those of Frijns et al. (2008) may be due to methodology. They
use model-based methodologies for decomposing the bid-ask spread into its components (Madhavan et al.
1997; Glosten and Harris 1988) while we use a model-free methodology which is feasible thanks to the
richness of the data.
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Fig. 3 Price impact with and without insider trading. This figure shows the mean price impact, broken
down into size terciles, on dates with insider trading (dashed line) and dates without insider trading (solid
lines). The price impact is scaled by the quote mid-point. Time is in seconds. Days without insider trading
are 10 days preceding and 10 days following insider trading
tive has passed. The implicit trading cost, not accounting for commissions and fees, is
best represented by the effective spread. In our case, it would be 0.118%/2 (the trader
pays half the spread for a single trade), i.e.e5.90. On days of insider trading, this cost
would jump to e47.40/2= e23.70. This cost could be further decomposed into infor-
mation asymmetry costs and liquidity costs. The part due to information asymmetry
is 0.062%/2, i.e. e3.10 on days without insider trading, and e5.15 on days of insider
trading.
4.1 Abnormal Illiquidity
To analyze the change in liquidity and price impact due to insider trading, for each
company-date pair, we use the Abnormal Illiquidity measure, defined in Sect. 2.1,
above. Figure 4 shows the Abnormal Illiquidiy and Cumulative Abnormal Illiquidity
for each liquidity measure (quoted spread, effective spread and price impact), and for
each size category (small, medium, large).
We see from Fig. 4 that for small firms, all Abnormal Illiquidity measures are
different from zero at day zero, i.e. on the insider trading day, but not afterwards. The
Cumulative Abnormal Price Impact remains statistically different from zero on day
1 and on day 4. This means that insiders induce an increase in illiquidity on the date
at which they trade. This increase is important as it is close to 5 basis points for the
quoted spread and the effective spread, and close to 10 basis points for the price impact.
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These numbers can be compared with the average values for the liquidity measure in
the sample provided in Table 2, where we see that the average effective spread is
about 1.35% of the share price before MAD and 0.70% after MAD. So an abnormal
effective spread on insider trading day of 0.05% is an economically non-negligible
increase.
Medium firms show a different pattern than small firms on date of insider trading
for the Abnormal Quoted Spread and the Abnormal Effective spread. The average
Abnormal Illiquidity is negative for these measures, but not statistically different from
zero. However, the Abnormal Price Impact is positive and significant: an increase of
about 3 to 4 basis points (compared to an average beforeMAD of 0.19% and of 0.16%
after MAD).
Figure 4 shows as well that large firms are not systematically affected in their
liquidity on days of insider trading. The Abnormal Illiquidity is close to zero and non
significant on day zero. However, there is a pattern of increasingCumulativeAbnormal
Illiquidity for this size category. For the effective spread and the price impact, theCAI
reaches a significant 7 basis points on day 4. There is a similar increase for the quoted
spread, but it is not statistically significant. Thismeans that for large firms, the liquidity
measures react with a delay to insider trading. This pattern can be explained by the
fact that there is a large number of trades during a day for this firm size, and thus the
insiders can hide better their trades, so that it takes more time for liquidity providers
to detect and react to the presence of insiders on the market. This result is similar to
the findings in Gleason (2007) where the author observes that NASDAQ stocks with a
larger number of dealers (i.e. larger stocks) are less affected by insider trading in terms
Fig. 4 Cumulative Abnormal Illiquidity for different market capitalization. These graphs show the Abnor-
mal Illiquidity (vertical lines) and the Cumulative Abnormal Illiquidity (line plot) for the three spread
measures (quoted spread, effective spread and price impact), and for the three size categories. In each
graph, the x axis represents the day after insider trading date (day zero is the insider trading day itself), and
the y axis is the Abnormal Illiquidity, in percentage points. The marker represents the significance level.
A triangle means significant at the 10% level; a square means significant at the 5% level; a circle means
significant at the 1% level. See text for details about data and methodology
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of bid-ask spread. Also, Khan et al. (2005) finds that for the largest 100 NASDAQ
stocks, the bid-ask spread widens with delay to insider sales, and the authors interpret
this results as dealers trying to recover their loss over time after insider trading. A
similar interpretation can be made for our results.
4.2 Cross-Sectional Analysis of CAI
To study more in details the determinants of Abnormal Illiquidity, we use a regression
framework where the Cumulative Abnormal Illiquidity is regressed on explanatory
variables. The following regression is performed:
CAIi = β0 + β1BUYi + β2Reti + β3Ret × BUYi + β4logHoldingi
+β5logInsTr Szi + β6Volty3mi + β7MADi + εi , (3)
whereCAIi is the CumulativeAbnormal Illiquidity (either for quoted spread, effective
spread or price impact) over day 0 and 19 for insider trading event i; BUYi is a
dummy variable indicating insider purchases, Reti is the average return of the stock
during 10 days prior to (but not including) the insider trading day; Ret × BUYi is an
interaction term to analyze the effect of stock return when there is an insider purchase.
logHoldingi and logInsTr Szi are the holding of the insider and the size of the trade,
respectively. Volty3mi is the volatility of the stock computed during the three months
prior to the event, and finally,MADi is a dummy that equals 1 after the implementation
of the Market Abuse Directive (October 2005). In this regression, we use stock fixed-
effects, so the coefficients estimated are to be interpreted as within firm effects.10
Results are shown in Table 4.
The coefficients of the purchase dummies are small, but for the price impact equa-
tion, the dummy is significant at the 5% level. This result shows that when insiders
buy shares, they affect price impact to a lesser extent than when they sell. This is sur-
prising given that insider purchases are known to have higher information content (in
the sense that insider purchases can predict future stock returns, as shown in the liter-
ature). But here, results show that market participants, on the short run, react stronger
when insiders sell shares than when they buy.
Looking at the coefficient of Ret , we see that it is negative, large and significant
for quoted spread and effective spread. Since the coefficients of Reg × BUY are
insignificant, it means that an insider trade following an increase in stock price affects
negatively the Cumulative Abnormal Illiquidity. In other terms, an insider trade after a
run-up in price does not affect liquidity of the stock.But on the contrary, an insider trade
following a decrease in stock price strongly affects liquidity. It might be that market
participants are more nervous and are prone to withdraw liquidity after a decline in
prices.
9 CAI over day 0 and 1 is used as the dependent variable instead of simply the abnormal illiquidity on
day zero because if the trade by the insider occurs close to the closing time, or after the closing time, other
market participants might react to it the next trading day.
10 Note that with this specification, the cross-sectional determinants of the liquidity measures, like firm
size or trading volume, are captured by the unobserved effects.
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Table 4 Regression of cumulative abnormal illiquidity on explanatory variables
CAI-QS CAI-ES CAI-PI
BUY −0.0811 −0.0952 −0.0667
(−0.99) (−1.00) (−1.99)
Ret −3.0327 −2.3642 2.7150
(−1.90) (−2.39) (0.71)
Ret×BUY 1.0765 0.5080 −3.1341
(0.52) (0.35) (−0.73)
logHolding 0.0449 0.0362 −0.0178
(0.90) (0.78) (−0.37)
logInsTrSz −0.0273 −0.0245 −0.0118
(−1.57) (−1.56) (−0.89)
Volty3m −0.0020 0.1827 −1.0757
(−0.01) (0.91) (−2.08)
MAD −0.0519 0.0041 −0.0565
(−1.14) (0.18) (−1.10)
N 597 597 597
Adj. R2 0.0138 0.0085 0.0453
This table shows the regression results of Cumulative Abnormal Illiquidity (CAI) on explanatory variables.
BUY is a dummy variable indicating a purchase by insider. Ret is the return of the stock 10 days prior to
the insider trading event. Ret×BUY is an interaction variable between Ret and BUY. logHolding is the log
of the prior holding of the insider in shares scaled by the number of shares outstanding. logInsTrSz is the
log of the size of the trade in shares scaled by the number of shares outstanding. Volty3m is the stock’s
daily volatility computed three months prior to the insider trade. MAD is a dummy that equals one after the
implementation of the Market Abuse Directive. Stock fixed-effects are used (not shown). Robust t statistics
are shown in brackets
The coefficients on logHolding and on logInsTr Sz are not significant: the size of
the trade and the prior holding of the insider are not important to explain the liquidity
effects of their trades. Volty3m is important only for abnormal price impact, with a
negative coefficient. This means that when insiders trade in periods of large volatility,
they affect less the price impact compared to periods of low volatility. This can be
understood as large volatilities can help the insider to hide better his trades to other
market participants. Or alternatively, when volatility is high, the price impact is already
higher than usual, as can be seen in Table 2, above.
The regression results show also that once we control for the relevant explanatory
factors, the effect of the Market Abuse Directive on the Abnormal Illiquidity is not
significant. The new regulation does not help to reduce the impact of insider trading
on liquidity and price impact.
The results in this section can be summarized as follows. In a univariate analysis,
we find that small firms are the ones for which liquidity reacts the most to legal insider
trading: 5 basis points for the quoted and effective spread, and 10 basis points for the
price impact. For medium-sized firms, only the price impact increases. For large firms,
Fig. 4 suggests that the CAI increase with a delay of a couple of days after insider
trading. This shows that in average, trades by insiders affect the liquidity of their
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stocks and the permanent price impact around the dates at which they trade. Next, we
investigated what could be the determinants of this short-term change in liquidity and
price impact. A regression analysis with stock fixed-effects shows that the size of the
insider trade and the insider’s prior holding do not affect abnormal liquidity. The most
important determinants of Abnormal Illiquidity is the return of the stock prior to the
trade by an insider: when the stock has negative returns prior to the trade, the insider
induces a larger effect on the quoted spread and effective spread. And vice versa: when
the stock increases before the trade, the effect of insider trading on liquidity is reduced.
The determinants of the abnormal price impact are different: sales by insiders have a
larger effect on price impact than purchases. Also, stock volatility negatively explains
abnormal price impact.
5 Conclusion
Insider trading is a regulated activity in most of the countries around the world. Even
if insiders are prohibited by law to trade upon private and price-sensitive information,
their trades are in average more information driven than those of outside investors. In
this paper, we use legal trades by corporate insiders to analyze whether the presence of
insiders on themarket affects liquiditymeasures on the stockmarket as well as adverse
selection. This study is done in the context of the implementation of a European-wide
regulation, the Market Abuse Directive, that enhanced market surveillance and insider
trading regulations. In order to do so, we use legal insider trading data from the
Netherlands on Dutch listed companies.
Using a first approach, we perform a cross-sectional regression of the average
liquidity and price impact of each stock on their determinants and on a proxy for
the intensity, or prevalence, of insider trading. This allows us to estimate whether the
average liquidity and price impact are larger when insider trading is high, compared
to stocks where insider trading is low. We find that intensity of insider trading is an
important determinant of stock market liquidity and adverse selection. Also, we find
some evidence that the new regulation helps to reduce the effect of insider trading on
liquidity: after the implementation of the regulation, the variable intensity is a less
important factor explaining liquidity and price impact.
In a second approach, we focus on the short term, and we measure whether insider
trading affects liquidity and price impact on the days around their trades, compared
to a normal liquidity and price impact level. We find that for small stocks, quoted
spread, effective spread and price impact are all affected immediately on the day of
insider trading. For medium firms, only the price impact changes on insider trading
dates, not the other liquidity measures. For large firms, we find an impact but with a
delay of two to four days after the date of transaction, as if market participants react
late to the presence of a potentially informed trader. Finally, we test what could be
the determinants of the effect insiders have on liquidity and price impact when they
trade. For the quoted and effective spread, we find that it is mostly the return of the
stock prior to the insider trading event that counts. For the price impact, we find that
the effect induced by insiders depends on whether the trade is a purchase or a sale,
and also on the volatility of the stock prior to the trade.
123
Legal Insider Trading and Stock Market Liquidity 103
An important contribution of this paper is to test the ability of the European Union
directive, implemented in the Netherlands as the Market Abuse Decree, to improve
liquidity and reduce adverse selection. We find that stock average liquidity and price
impact are less affected by the intensity of insider trading after the implementation of
the regulation. This means that even if legal insider trading remains prevalent after the
regulation, outside traders do not find it a threat and so liquidity and price impact are
less affected by it. This is true in average. Our second approach, looking specifically
on dates of insider trading, did not find that liquidity and price impact are less affected
by insider trading after the regulation was passed.
Further analyses have to be done on this topic to understand the link between insider
trading and stock liquidity. First and foremost, a better understanding of the dynamics
of liquidity is called for, from which the specific impact of insider trading could be
better identified.
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